Brian Johnson -- Notes and Publications
A Neuropsychoanalytic approach to addiction.
Drug dreams: A neuropsychoanalytic hypothesis.
Perchance to
Dream: Book Review of Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of
Consciousness
Book Review: Jaak Panksepp (Ed.): Textbook of Biological Psychiatry Psychiatry. Neuro-psychoanalysis.
Commentary on Khantzian, Neuro-psychoanalysis.
"A
psychoanalytic model for the development of subjectivity" Fonagy et
al.
Affect
dysregulation and disorders of the self. by Allan Schore
Summary
Notes of Presentations at the International Neuro-Psychoanalysis Meeting,
Rome September 2004
| Johnson, B. (2003). A Neuro-psychoanalytic approach to addiction. Neuro-Psychoanalysis 5:29-34. |
These articles are provided
here for download, courtesy of
Neuro-psychoanalysis,
Journal of the International Neuro-Neuro-Psychoanalysis
Society, and its publisher, Karnac Books. |
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Book Review:
Jaak Panksepp
(Ed.): Textbook of Biological Psychiatry Psychiatry. Neuro-psychoanalysis.
5(1)
PDF |
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| Commentary on Khantzian, Neuro-psychoanalysis. 6(2) PDF |
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| Johnson, B. (2003). Psychological addiction, physical addiction, addictive character, addictive personality disorder: a new nosology of addiction. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis 11:135-160. PDF | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Johnson, B. (2001). Drug dreams: A neuropsychoanalytic hypothesis. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association: 49:75-96. PDF | ||||||||||||||||||||||
| Johnson, B. Perchance to Dream: Book Review of Allan Hobson's Dream Drugstore: Chemically Altered States of Consciousness PDF | ||||||||||||||||||||||
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Media: TV appearances include Channel 2 - Emily Rooney (under-anaesthesia detox), Channel 25 - Margie Reedy (legalization of marijuana), Channel 7 - Lester Strong (addictive drugs available at pharmacies). Quoted in US News and World Report, May 7, 2001, “Alcohol and the Brain” p.56
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Chapter 6 – "A psychoanalytic model for the development of
subjectivity"
Annotated
notes on:
Fonagy,
P, Gergely, G.,
Jurist, E., and Target, M.
(2002).
Affect
regulation, mentalization, and the development of the self
.
New York: Other Press.
Psychic equivalence mode – internal reality is external reality Pretend mode – internal reality is marked and different from external reality Integration of these modes leads to the capacity to mentalize, a reflexive mode of thought. An example of psychic equivalence: An obsessional person “knows” the door is locked, but checks because the internal image of an unsecured house has more meaning and power than external images provided by the senses. Theory of Mind – ability of children to attribute intentional mental states – goals, desires and beliefs – to oneself and others. E.g., In play, children can be developmentally advanced. A 3-year-old child shown a candy box, and believes it is full of candy until shown that it is filled with pencils. He then believes that he always thought it was full of pencils, and believes that another child shown the candy box will believe it to be full of pencils. But a 3-year-old child told to pretend that an adult drinks an imaginary glass of chocolate milk, and then to pretend that the glass is now full of lemonade, will remember that at first it was “filled” with chocolate milk. This capacity to mentalize has the following advantages: a. The child can have a sense of continuity of the self as the world changes. The world changes do not change the child. b. The child sees others’ actions as meaningful through attribution of thoughts and feelings. It makes people predictable. c. The child acquires a distinction between inner and outer truth, distinguishing between bad people and bad behavior (valuable in the case of abusive parents). d. It enables communication between people with two points of view. Conversation becomes a collaboration. e. It allows higher intersubjectivity, deeper experience with others. Play with parents and other children reflects the child and reality, while breaking away from psychic equivalence. Fonagy describes the psychoanalysis of Rebecca, 4 and without a father. Rebecca could not play through not having a father with her 22 year old mother because the mother reacted too severely. Rebecca had pretended that her grandfather was her father, and his death and her mother’s grief precipitated the depression which brought her to treatment. Her fantasies were forced into a mode of psychic equivalence. Her feelings of hurt and shame about being fatherless could not be discussed with anyone. Mother’s reflection of Rebecca included the feeling that Rebecca had “pirated” her independence. Fonagy tolerates her feelings and plays this all through in typical analytic style. The adult adopts the child’s mental stance and represents it to him as a “third object,” the scaffolding of the child’s sense of self. If the adult cannot think about a piece of reality, neither child nor adult can “metabolize” the thoughts. The development of the child’s perceptions of mental states depends on the psychic reality of the caregiver.
This
shifts our language/thinking from “internalization of the object” to
“internalization of the thinking self from the object’s thinking.”
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Notes on: Schore, A. (2003). Affect dysregulation and disorders of the self. NY: W.W. Norton. Temperamental attunement with a good caregiver is the result of ventral tegmental development via positive interactions. The opiate system is originally sculpted by infant/mother interactions. The eventual result is the ability to gain pleasure (endorphins) from being related. Insecure avoidance may be the result of selective pruning of this system, coupled with expansion of the lateral tegmental inhibitory system. The right brain relational regulation system is formed or deformed by early experiences.
Amygdala inhibition of hippocampal function at high levels of arousal mediates diminution of conscious explicit memory in traumatic events, yet implicit memory is retained
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Summary Notes of Presentations at the International Neuro-Psychoanalysis Meeting, Rome September 2004. By Brian Johnson Howard Shevrin · Administered the Hysterical-Obsessional Scale · Obsessionals saw spiders, not snakes · Hysterics didn’t see · Results very statistically significant Panksepp
Panksepp-Shevrin bet on unconscious affect, tested with the tachistoscope. 10 positive or 10 negative words. Subject marks intensity of feeling: happy/sad, power. Power shifted significantly (larger) after positive words. (Panksepp feels sad reflects endorphin lack.) Affect not read out of the cortex, is one component (with cognition) of emotion. Intense feeling suppresses cortical functioning. Conscious affects of distress with unconscious cognitive correlates drive people to treatment. Guido Gainotti
Denial as it relates to right hemisphere lesions: Amytal in left carotid causes depression Amytal in right carotid causes euphoria Left lesions cause anxiety and bursts of tears (appropriate) Right lesions cause joking and lack of attention to results of injury Emotional system – rapid and mostly ucs responses Cognitive system – slow and mostly cs Leventhal’s categories of emotions Sensorimotor – innate Schematic – stored in memories Conceptual – thinking about experiences Patients with right hemisphere injuries decode emotional experiences poorly Largest galvanic skin response when stimuli presented to right hemisphere Upsetting films – Normal and left brain damaged patients turned away, right damaged patients tolerated/watched. Gainotti (2002) – · Right brain processes schematic emotions · Left – conceptual, left brain damaged patients · Masked (ucs) stimuli decoded in right amygdala · Conscious stimuli decoded in left amygdala · Thalmus input transmitted to right amygdala, procedural ucs · Thalmus input transmitted to visual cortex, then left amygdala, dynamic unconscious.
For Gainotti and Panksepp, take home message was that only cortical material can be repressed. Maggie Zellner, “Neonatal isolation reduces food-rewarded operant responding in rats” DEPRESSION causes EARLY STRESS Depression/dec dopamine REDUCED MOTIVATION dec dopamine Animals with maternal deprivation administer more drugs No decrease in consummatory behavior, but decreased locomotion and anticipatory behavior Blunted response to change in sucrose concentration No difference in sucrose-maintained lever pressing No difference in total acquisition of learning how to press lever BUT Difference in rate of acquisition of learning Non-isolated rats had a higher break point – how hard they will work to get the next pellet
Gokce Ozkarar Left frontal hypoactivation in schizophrenia: words presented to left and right ear. Loose associations (lack of relatedness to original word) occurred only when word registered in the wild right hemisphere, (Freud: id not monitored by ego). Left frontal lesions also lead to schizophrenia-like symptoms.
Bottom line: find ways to empirically test psychoanalytic ideas.
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